n , it appears natural to define a pseudorandom function (PRF) by adding (or XORing) the permutation results:
Introduction
Cryptography requires an encryption function to be invertible: Someone knowing the (secret) key must be able to recover the plaintext from the ciphertext. Accordingly, under a fixed key, a n-bit block cipher is a permutation π : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . The classical security requirement is that π must behave pseudorandomly, i.e. must be un-distinguishable from a random permutation over {0, 1} n without knowing the secret key. In practice, block ciphers are used in many different modes of operations, and not all of them need an invertible cipher. Sometimes, being invertible can even hinder the security of schemes using the cipher. One such example is the "cipher block chaining" (CBC) mode, a standard mode of operation for block ciphers: if more than about 2 n/2 blocks are encrypted, the ciphertext leaks information about the plaintext [2] . So why not simply use a dedicated pseudorandom function (PRF) instead of a pseudorandom permutation (PRP) in such cases? Two reasons are:
-Applications may need both invertible ciphers and schemes where the cipher better would not be invertible. Double-using one primitive to implement both is less expensive in terms of memory or chip space. -There exist quite a lot of "proven" block ciphers, i.e., block ciphers published years ago, intensively cryptanalysed and widely trusted today. There are not as many good candidates for dedicated PRFs.
Hence, instead of constructing pseudorandom functions from scratch, we consider creating them using pseudorandom permutations as underlying building
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blocks. Recently, the question of how to do this has caught the attention of the cryptographic community [5, 7] . Let π 1 , . . . , π d denote random permutations over {0, 1} n and ⊕ the bit-wise XOR. Bellare, Krovetz and Rogaway [5] point out that the construction sum 2 (x) = π 1 (x) ⊕ π 2 (x) has not (yet) been analysed. In the current paper, we generalise this and analyse sum d : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n with sum d (x) = π 1 (x) ⊕ · · · ⊕ π d (x).
Organisation of this Paper: Section 2 and Section 3 present the notation and the basic definitions we use in this paper and describe some previous research. Section 4 describes the security of the PRF sum d (x) = 1≤i≤d π i (x). In the following section, we analyse the
. Section 6 provides some comments and conclusions. For better tangibility, the appendix considers the two-dimensional special case sum 2 .
Preliminaries
We write IF m,n for the set of all functions {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n and IF n = IF n,n . For choosing a random value x, uniformly distributed in a set M , we write x ∈ R M . A random function ψ ∈ IF m,n is a function ψ ∈ R IF m,n . If S n is the set of all permutations in IF n , a random permutation over {0, 1}
n is a function π ∈ R S n . To measure the "pseudorandomness" of a function f ∈ IF m,n , chosen "somehow randomly" but in general not uniformly distributed, we consider an adversary A trying to distinguish between f and a random function R ∈ R IF m,n . A has access to an oracle Q. A chooses inputs x ∈ {0, 1} n ; Q responds Q(x) ∈ {0, 1} n . Q either simulates R ∈ R IF m,n , or f . A's output is A(Q) ∈ {0, 1}. We view A as a probabilistic algorithm, hence the output A(Q) is a random variable over {0, 1}. A(Q) depends on the random choice of f and the internal coin flips of A and Q. We evaluate the (unsigned) difference of the probabilities pr[A(Q) = 1] for Q = R and Q = f , i.e. A's "PRF advantage" Adv approximatively describe a practically secure block cipher under a random key as an (∞, 0)-secure PRP, see Section 6.1.
We interchangeably view b-bit strings s = (s b−1 , . . . , s 0 ) ∈ {0, 1} b as b-bit numbers s = 0≤i<b s i * 2 i .
Previous Work

Using a PRP as PRF
It is widely known that a random permutation over {0, 1} n is a (q, q 2 /2 n )-secure PRF. Since it nicely fits to our later results, we formalise this here:
n+1 . An adversary A * exists to distinguish π from a random function with an advantage of Adv
Proof (Sketch). If by chance a random function R behaves like a permutation, i.e., for all q pairs (x 1 , R(x 1 )) no collision R(x i ) = R(x j ) with x i = x j occurs, then no adversary can distinguish between R and a random permutation. On the other hand, any collision proves that R is no permutation. With q inputs, the probability to get a collision is 2
Theorem 1 justifies to use a block cipher (i.e. a PRP) as a PRF -if the famous birthday bound q 2 n/2 is observed. What about q > 2 n/2 ? Note that the function f ⊕ with f ⊕ (x) = π(x) ⊕ x is unlikely to be invertible, but is not a better PRF since π(
Using simple operations and PRFs as Building Blocks
Much research dealt with constructing complex cryptographic operations from (seemingly) simple ones: Levin [8] constructed "pseudorandom bit generators" from "one-way functions", Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [6] constructed PRFs from "pseudorandom bit generators", and Luby and Rackoff [9] constructed PRPs from PRFs. A lot of work has been done on improvements of the Luby-Rackoff construction, some recent examples are [10] [11] [12] . Now we are going into the opposite direction: We construct PRFs from PRPs. Another direction of cryptographic research was how to construct PRFs from smaller PRFs. Aiello and Venkatesan [1] presented a construction for PRFs over {0, 1} 2n using PRFs over {0, 1} n as building blocks.
Constructing a PRF from PRPs
"Data dependent re-keying" was proposed by Bellare, Krovetz, and Rogaway [5] . Here, a block cipher E with k-bit keys is a family of 2 k independent random permutations. Set j := k/n . For keys
; ( * Use the derived key K to encrypt the input. * ) In a formal model, data dependent re-keying is provably more secure than simply using one PRP as a PRF [5] . The model is based on the adversary having access to the block cipher E by asking additional oracle queries: choose keys K ∈ {0, 1} k and texts T ∈ {0, 1} n and ask the oracle for E K (T ) and E −1 Hall et. al. [7] examine two constructions. Let d ∈ {0, . . . , n} and π be a PRP over {0, 1} n . The "truncate" construction is defined by f
. . , n} and a PRP π over {0, 1}
n , the order construction realizes a PRF f
The order construction provably preserves the full security of π:
is a (∞, 0)-secure PRF. On the other hand, the order construction is quite slow, since computing f
Recently, Bellare and Impagliazzo [3] described a general probabilistic lemma to upper bound the advantage of an adversary in distinguishing between two families of functions.
2
As an example for applying their general technique, they consider converting a PRP into a PRF. They analyse sum 2 , the two-dimensional special case of the sum d -construction we consider in the current paper. They also apply their general technique to analyse two more PRP→PRF constructions: the twin 2 variant of sum 2 (not using the name "twin 2 "), and the truncate construction from [7] .
In the appendix, we regard the two-dimensional special case sum 2 . The proof of Theorem 5 in the appendix is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 in this section, 1 In fact, [7] deals with a function f
is the largest power of two dividing (2
requires 2 d invocations of π and 2 d − 1 comparisons. 2 When the current paper was originally written, its author was unaware of [3] . An anonymous referee provided the reference.
but requires less technical details. It may be instructive for the reader to first skip to the appendix at page 13 and work through the proof of Theorem 5, and then to continue with the current section.
The proof of Theorem 2 requires some technical definitions and lemmas provided below. Set N := {0, 1} n .
is a uniformly distributed random value in N if and only if T is fair. To deal with sets that may be unfair, we also define a measurement of being "almost fair".
-If a set V ⊆ N d exists with |V | = z and V ∩ T = {}, such that V ∪ T is fair. We call V a "completion set" (short: "c-set") for T .
-Or if a set U ⊆ T with |U | = z exists (an "overhanging set" or "o-set"), such that T − U is fair. We also say: T is "z-overhanging-fair". Proof. The proofs of (a) and (c) are trivial. Regarding (b), note that A is fair:
, and, for every (
Note that such a set B * exists since |B| = |B * | ≤ |A| and both A and B are fair. By R ⊆ B * , we denote the set of such representatives, I.e., |R| = |A ∩ B|. Since A − B * = (A − B) − R is fair, i.e., A − B is |R|-overhanging-fair.
Lemma 2. Consider the sets
For (a), let V ⊆ N d−1 with |V | = z be a c-set for T . Due to Lemma 1(a), both sets T × (T ∪ V ) and (T ∪ V ) × V are fair, and 
Proof (of Theorem 2). Our adversary asks q ≤ 2 n−1 /d oracle queries. We write x 1 , . . . , x q for the inputs chosen by the adversary and y 1 , . . . , y q for the oracle's corresponding outputs. W. l. o. g., we assume x i = x j for i = j. Evaluating sum d on these inputs may be thought of as choosing q values π k (x 1 ), . . . , π k (x q ) for every k ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Since π k is a random permutation over {0, 1} n , the values π k (x 1 ), . . . , π k (x q ) are random values in N = {0, 1} n , except that π k (x i ) = π k (x j ) for i = j. We simply write π k,j for π k (x j ). Now, generating the random values y i = sum d (x i ) may be thought of as choosing π k,i ∈ R N − {π k,1 , . . . , π k,i−1 } for k ∈ {1, . . . , d} and evaluating
We may as well regard this as choosing the d-tuple π 1,i , . . . ,
We can simulate the generation of the values y j as follows:
The sets T i+1 are i d -fair: We set j := i + 1 and show that if d is odd, a c-set V j exists for T j with |V j | = (j − 1) d , and, if d is even, an o-set U j for T j of size |U j | = (j − 1) d exists. We prove this by induction. If d = 1, V j = {y 1 , . . . , y j−1 } is a c-set for T j and |V j | = (j − 1) 
Note
. Depending on d, we provide some examples. For every adversary A, we get:
In general, sum d is secure against adversaries asking q d+1 √ 2 dn−1 queries. If a pessimistic estimate of q gives a value q 2 n , we can choose d accordingly. In practice, d will be small, e.g., d ≤ 10.
The Construction TWIN
The sum d -construction requires d independent PRPs π 1 , . . . , π d . We may use one block cipher running under d different keys to implement the π i . Depending on our choice of block cipher and on hardware limitations, frequently changing between encryption under d different keys may be costly, though. Can we construct a secure PRF using a single PRP π over {0, 1}? Consider the function
(Recall that we interchangeably view b-bit strings s ∈ {0, 1} b as numbers s ∈ {0, . . . , 2 b − 1}. Thus, x ∈ {0, 1} n− log 2 (d) represents a number x ≤ (2 n−log 2 (d) − 1) = 2 n /d − 1, the product dx is at most 2 n − d, and hence dx + d − 1 ≤ 2 n − 1 can be written as an n-bit string.)
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 2, the adversary asksueries x 1 , . . . , x q , w.l.o.g. x i = x j for i = j, and learns q responses y i = twin(x i ). We define
n , and
. Similar to Equation (1), we define a set T * i of the d-tuples still avaliable:
and
Note that |T * *
We simulate generating the y i :
Compare Equations (1) 
Set bad := 0; for i := 1 to q: determine T * * i and Ui; ti = (π di−d+1 , . . . , π di ) ∈ R T * * i ; if ti ∈ Ui then ( * ) bad := 1; if t ∈ C * then ( * * ) ti ∈ R T * * i ∩ C * ; bad := 1; output yi := π di−d+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ π di ; output bad.
Odd d:
Set bad := 0; for i := 1 to q: determine T * * i and Vi; ti = (π di−d+1 , . . . , π di ) ∈ R T * * i ∪ Vi; if t ∈ T * * i then ( * ) choose ti ∈ R T * * i ; bad := 1; if t ∈ C * then ( * * ) ti ∈ R T * * i ∩ C * ; bad := 1; output yi := π di−d+1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ π di ; output bad.
Fig. 2. Two simulations for twin
Consider d ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Based on Equations (2)- (4), we get
The (2
−dn+1
0≤i<q i d )-term determines the maximum size of q, at least if d is such small and for practically interesting n ≥ 64. We conclude: for small d, the PRF-security of twin d is close to the PRF-security of sum d .
Final Comments
Practical Security
We presented constructions for PRFs from permutations, and we proved our PRFs to be (q, a)-secure if the permutations are (∞, 0)-secure (or "ideal") PRPs.
In practice, our PRPs (i.e. block ciphers) are not ideal ones. What we actually are interested in is a close relationship between the derivation of the underlying permutations from being ideal (∞, 0)-secure PRPs, and the derivation of the constructed PRF from being (∞, 0)-secure. This is quite straightforward, and we exemplify this for the twin d -construction:
Theorem 4. Let q and a be chosen such that twin d is (q, a)-secure in the ideal case. Let B be a (t, qd, δ)-secure PRP. The function f : {0,
is (t − qt , q, a + δ)-secure. Here, t , denotes the time to evaluate Expression (6) .
Note that the function f is indeed an instantiation of the PRF twin d using the concrete (non-ideal) PRP B.
Proof (of Theorem 4).
Assume an adversary A f running at most t − qt units of time, asking for q values f (x 1 ), . . . f (x q ), achieves an advantage Adv
We describe an adversary A B for B, using A f as some kind of "subroutine". The performance of A B disproves the (t, qd, δ)-security of B.
Whenever A f chooses x ∈ {0, 1} n− log 2 d and asks for f (x), A B asks for the values B(dx), . . . , B(dx + d − 1) and evaluates Expression (6) . A B uses the output-bit produced by A f as its own output-bit.
Running A B requires the running time for A f plus the additional time qt for q evaluations of (6), andueries for the f -oracle are translated into dq queries for the B-oracle. Since twin d is (q, a)-secure in the ideal case, and since A f is assumed to achieve an advantage of more than a + δ, the advantage of A B in distinguishing between B and an ideal block cipher exceeds δ.
Given an estimate of the number q of plaintext/ciphertext pairs the adversary can learn, and given the block size n, the security architect must decide on the size of the parameter d. Our analysis provides precise bounds (instead of asymptotic estimates) to help her making a reasonable decision. This kind of reasoning, the "concrete security analysis", was initiated in [4] .
Super Pseudorandom Permutations
Luby and Rackoff [9] introduced a distinction between super PRPs and (ordinary) PRPs: For ordinary PRPs, the adversary may only choose values x and ask the oracle Q for Q(x). Such adversaries are "chosen plaintext" adversaries. On the other hand, super PRPs need to resist "combined chosen plaintext / chosen ciphertext" adversaries, i.e., adversaries also able to choose y and ask for Q −1 (y). For our constructions we don't need super PRPs -ordinary PRPs are sufficient. This makes our results all the more meaningful.
Comparison and Conclusion
This paper deals with the construction of PRFs from PRPs. We propose two constructions, sum d : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and twin d {0, 1} n− log 2 (d) → {0, 1} n , based on PRPs over {0, 1} n . Our constructions preserve the security of the underlying PRP better than the truncate construction from [7] and are much more efficient than the order construction, also from [7] .
The truncate construction from [7] is re-considered in [3] , claiming an improved security analysis compared to [7] . Also, [3] deals with sum 2 and twin 2 -the two-dimensional variants of the constructions we scrutinise here. In short, if the number q of oracle queries is q 2 n /O(n), both the sum 2 and the twin 2 construction are claimed to be secure. (For twin 2 , a short sketch of proof is given.) Note that the results in claimed in [3] are significantly better than the results provided in the current paper. Now consider data dependent re-keying, (DDRK) [5] . If k is the key size of the underlying block cipher, the result on the security of DDRK [5, Theorem 5.2] requires q 2 4k/5 . In fact, that result depends on the assumption that exhaustively searching 2 4k/5 keys is infeasible. If, say, k = 80, the effective keylength guaranteed by the result is only 4 * 80/5 bit = 64 bit. This is a disadvantage, compared to our schemes. (Note though: [5] conjecture that the bound on q can be improved to q 2 k(1− ) .) Depending on which block cipher is used and on hardware constraints, the very frequent key changes needed for DDRK can constitute another disadvantage.
For some applications, e.g. on low-end smartcards, even the effort to switch between only d fixed secret keys may be prohibitive. In this case, the twin d construction is superior to sum d , if a PRF with only n − log 2 (d) input bits is acceptable.
